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The paper investigates cross-country differences in technology in a large sample of developed and 
developing economies over the 1990s. The empirical analysis indicates the existence of three 
technology clubs with markedly different levels of technological development: advanced, followers 
and marginalized countries. The technology clubs also differ with respect to their dynamics over the 
1990s. While the club of followers is characterized by a process of gradual convergence towards the 
technological frontier, the group of marginalized has experienced an increase in its gap in terms of 
innovative capabilities.  
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1.  Introduction 
Applied growth theory has experienced significant advances in the last ten years. 
Moving away from the traditional cross-country growth regression framework, 
empirical works have made use of a wide array of different econometric techniques, 
and have pointed out the great heterogeneity of countries’ characteristics and growth 
behaviour. The study of the variety of macroeconomic growth patterns now 
constitutes a central research theme in growth theory (Temple, 1999). 
Already two decades ago, Baumol (1986) observed the existence of three convergence 
clubs in the world economy, i.e. three groups of countries that, due to their differences 
in terms of initial conditions, tend to follow diverging growth trajectories over time. 
Baumol’s original insight has inspired a great amount of applied research in the last 
few years. Durlauf and Johnson (1995) developed this idea further, and classified 
world countries into four groups according to their variety in initial conditions (i.e. 
initial levels of GDP per capita and of literacy rate). Their empirical study confirmed 
the existence of different convergence clubs with markedly different characteristics 
and growth behaviour, and inspired a set of subsequent empirical works (Desdoigts, 
1999; Hobijn and Franses, 2000; Johnson and Takeyama, 2001; Fiaschi and Lavezzi, 
2003; Canova, 2004; Paap et al., 2005). 
The idea that countries that differ in terms of initial conditions experience diverging 
growth performances has also inspired a set of related contributions, which have 
studied the evolution of the world distribution of income and pointed out the existence 
of increasing polarization between the club of rich and the group of poor countries 
(Quah, 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1997). Empirical analyses investigating the so-called 
emerging twin-peaks in the world distribution of income have flourished in the last 
decade (e.g. Bianchi, 1997; Jones, 1997; Paap and van Dijk, 1998; Anderson, 2004). 
What are the factors that may explain these empirical findings on clustering, 
polarization and convergence clubs? One common answer, pointed out by multiple 
equilibria models (e.g. Azariadis and Drazen, 1990), is related to threshold 
externalities in the accumulation of physical and human capital. One major alternative 
explanation, recently proposed by Schumpeterian endogenous growth models 
(Howitt, 2000; Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005), points to innovation and to the 
international diffusion of new technologies as the possible sources of polarization and 
convergence clubs.  Economic historians (Gerschenkron, 1962; Landes, 1969) have long ago argued that 
developing countries may exploit their backwardness position by imitating and 
adopting new technologies produced in advanced economies, but they have also 
shown that the process of imitation is costly, and it requires the existence of 
technological capabilities that many developing countries lack (Abramovitz, 1986). In 
this framework, the basic reason for the existence of different clubs in the world 
economy is that countries greatly differ in terms of their technological capabilities, 
and, hence, in terms of their ability to catch up by imitating foreign technologies. 
Countries with greater levels of technological development are able to catch up and to 
converge gradually towards the club of advanced economies, while countries with 
lower capabilities are not able to exploit the scope for catching up, and inexorably fall 
further behind.
1  
This general hypothesis leads to one major question. Does the empirical evidence 
support the idea of the existence of clubs of countries characterized by different levels 
of technological development and different technological dynamics? This question 
has not been considered yet in applied growth theory. It constitutes an important 
research question for the literature on clustering, polarization and convergence clubs, 
and this paper aims at investigating it. 
The purpose of the paper is thus to study the existence, characteristics and dynamics 
of different technology clubs in the world economy. The paper, empirical in nature, 
will explore the existence of groups of countries characterized by different levels of 
technological development, point out their characteristics and the technological 
distance that separates them, and analyse their different dynamics over time. 
The analysis makes use of the ArCo database, a dataset recently constructed by 
Archibugi and Coco (2004a; 2004b) that contains a set of indicators on various 
aspects of countries’ technological activities for a large number of developed and 
developing economies. The sample is constituted by 131 countries, whose 
technological levels are measured at two different points in time, at the beginning and 
at the end of the 1990s. The dataset makes it possible to consider various aspects of 
                                                 
1 The idea that technology is a major factor to explain cross-country differences in growth performance 
is not only interesting from a theoretical point of view, but it is also supported by a large number of 
empirical works (e.g. Bernard and Jones, 1996; Prescott, 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly and 
Levine, 2001). Overviews of the literature on technology and convergence have been presented by 
Fagerberg (1994), Islam (1999) and Gong and Keller (2003). For a more general discussion of the 
study of technological change and economic growth in different strands of research, see Castellacci 
(2006). 
  1countries’ technological capabilities, such as their ability to create and to imitate new 
technologies, their technological infrastructures and their education levels. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the indicators used 
to measure countries’ technological capabilities. Section 3 reports the results of a 
hierarchical cluster analysis, which explores the existence of various groups of 
countries differing in terms of their levels of technological development. The results 
of the cluster analysis show the existence of three technology clubs with strikingly 
different technological characteristics.  
Section 4 shifts the focus to the study of the dynamics of these technology clubs. The 
analysis of cross-country patterns of technological change makes use of four different 
notions of convergence. Two of them are the well-known concepts of β-convergence 
and σ-convergence. The other two are new notions of convergence that the paper puts 
forward in order to refine these standard definitions. The first refinement (Q-
convergence) is based on the estimation of quantile regressions for different 
percentiles of the distributions of the growth rate of the technology indicators, while 
the second (cluster convergence) is based on the dynamics of the technology-gaps 
over time.  
The results of the convergence analysis show that the technology clubs are 
characterized by very different dynamics of technological change over the 1990s. 
While the club of followers is characterized by a process of gradual convergence 
towards the technological frontier, the group of marginalized has experienced an 
increase in its gap in terms of innovative capabilities. Section 5 concludes the paper 
by summing up the results and by pointing out their contribution to the applied growth 
literature. 
 
2.  Data and indicators of technological capabilities 
Technological change is a complex and multifaceted aspect of economic progress. 
Countries’ technological capabilities are strictly related to a number of different 
aspects, such as the basic and advanced human capital base, the infrastructures that 
support industrial production and innovative activities, and the country’s ability to 
create, imitate and manage a complex pool of advanced technological knowledge.  
The complexity of the concept of technology presents a formidable challenge to its 
measurement in empirical analyses. In the literature on technology and convergence, 
  2the standard approach to measure technological change is to rely on an indirect 
measure, the so-called ‘productivity residual’ or ‘total factor productivity’ (TFP; see 
Prescott, 1998; Islam, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 2001). In an attempt to provide a 
richer characterization and a more precise measurement of countries’ levels of 
technology, this paper follows a different strategy, and makes use of a set of 
indicators that measure directly various relevant aspects of countries’ technological 
capabilities. 
The empirical analysis is based on the ArCo database, a dataset recently constructed 
by Archibugi and Coco (2004a; 2004b) that includes a set of indicators of technology 
and technological capabilities for a large number of developed and developing 
economies. The sample used in this paper is constituted by 131 countries (listed in 
Appendix 2), whose technological capabilities are measured at two different points in 




Patents: Number of patents registered at the US Patent and Trademark Office per 
million people (USPTO, 2002). This is a measure of the technological innovations 
generated for commercial purposes. Patents represent a form of codified knowledge 
generated by profit-seeking firms and organisations.
3
  
Scientific articles: Number of scientific articles per million people (NSF, 2000 and 
2002).
4 Scientific literature is another important source of codified knowledge. It 
                                                 
2 For a more complete description of the dataset and the methodology used to construct it, see 
Archibugi and Coco (2004a), while the main differences between the ArCo technology index and other 
similar analyses to measure countries’ technological capabilities are described in Archibugi and Coco 
(2004b).  
 
3 To account for yearly fluctuations (which might affect the results in small and medium sized 
countries), we have considered a four-year moving average for the 1987-1990 and 1997-2000 periods. 
Patents are a good proxy of commercially exploitable and proprietary technological inventions, but we 
are well aware that many inventions are not patented, especially among those invented in developing 
countries. For surveys on patents as internationally comparable indicators, see Pavitt (1988) and 
Archibugi (1992). 
 
4 The source of these data is the Science Citation Index generated by the Institute for Scientific 
Information, which is the most comprehensive and validated available source on scientific publication. 
It reports information on the scientific and technical articles published in a sample of about 8,000 
journals selected among the most prestigious in the world. The fields covered are: physics, biology, 
chemistry, mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth 
and space sciences. Article counts are based on fractional assignments; for example, an article with two 
authors from different countries is counted as one-half article to each country.  
  3represents the knowledge generated in the public sector, and most notably in 
Universities and other public research centres, although researchers working in the 
business sector publish a significant and growing share of scientific articles. 
 
Internet penetration: Number of Internet users per 1,000 people (ITU, 2001; World 
Bank, 2003).
5 Internet is a new technology that has quickly become the keystone of 
the Information and Communication Technology, but it was not commercially 
available yet in 1990. For this reason, we have postponed the beginning of the period 
to 1994. 
  
Telephone penetration: Sum of telephone mainlines and mobile phones, per 1,000 
people (ITU, 2001; UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 2003).
6 Telephony, both in fixed and 
mobile forms, constitutes a fundamental infrastructure for business purposes, and it 
allows tracing populations with human skills and acquiring technical informations. 
 
Electricity consumption: Number of kilowatt of electricity consumed per hour per 
capita. This measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power 
plants, less distribution losses, and own use by heat and power plants (see World 
Bank, 2003, table 5.10). This indicator accounts for the oldest technological 
infrastructure. Electricity consumption is also a proxy measure for the use of 
machinery and equipment since most of it is generated by electric power.
7  
 
Tertiary science and engineering enrolment: Share of tertiary students in science and 
engineering in the population of that age group (UNESCO, 2002; World Bank, 2003). 
This variable is a measure of the formation of advanced human capital in science and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
5 Internet users access a worldwide network. They differ from Internet hosts, which are computers with 
active Internet Protocol (IP) addresses connected to the Internet. The data on users, when available, are 
preferable to those on hosts for two reasons: first, they give a more precise idea of the diffusion of 
Internet among the population; second, some hosts do not have a country code identification and in 
statistics are assumed to be located in the United States, thus causing a bias towards this country.  
 
6 We have chosen to assign equal weights to fixed and mobile phones because, although they 
incorporate different degrees of technology, they share the same function. 
 
7 Other valuable measures of industrial capacity developed, for example, by Lall and his colleagues 
(see Lall and Albaladejo, 2001; UNIDO, 2002) are available for a smaller number of countries only. 
 
  4technology, which represents a necessary requirement for acquiring and managing 
advanced technological knowledge. 
 
Mean years of schooling:  Average number of years of school completed in the 
population over 14 (Barro and Lee, 2001; UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 2003). 
Although this indicator does not consider differences in the quality of schooling 
across countries, it constitutes a widely used proxy of the level of basic human skill.  
 
Literacy rate: The percentage of people over 14 who can, with understanding, read 
and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life (UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 
2003). The literacy rate is a necessary precondition for the development of human 
skills and of basic and advanced human capital.  
 
These eight indicators are those that we will use to analyse cross-country differences 
in technological capabilities in the 1990s. The advantage of using a large number of 
indicators is that we are able to provide a more precise characterization of countries’ 
technological level than if we were using one single indirect measure such as the TFP. 
This is particularly important in a large sample that includes countries characterized 
by very different levels of technological and economic development. 
However, a major difficulty in using these indicators is that they represent to a great 
extent strictly related (and not easily separable) aspects of countries’ technological 
capabilities. Variables measuring the creation and diffusion of new technologies, 
technological infrastructures and human skills tend in fact to be highly correlated, as 
they all constitute complementary dimensions of national technological capabilities. 
Thus, before proceeding to the core of our empirical analysis, the study of cross-
country differences in technology, it is important to reduce this large set of indicators 
to a smaller number of distinct (not overlapping) dimensions.  
A factor analysis has been performed in order to select the best explanatory variables 
used to identify cross-country differences in technological capabilities, i.e. those 
variables that better discriminate between countries’ technological level.
8 The 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, in a comprehensive survey of growth theory, Temple (1999, p. 148) argues: “Despite 
some interest from development economists, simple techniques for data reduction like factor analysis 
and principal components have been largely ignored by recent growth researchers. Their use seems to 
have a great deal of potential”. For previous papers applying factor analysis to the study of economic 
growth and development, see Adelman and Morris (1965) and Temple and Johnson (1998). 
  5purpose of the factor analysis is to extract a smaller number of factors that are able to 
account for most of the variance in the sample.
9
Table 1 presents the results of the factor analysis for our ArCo dataset for the years 
1990 and 2000. In both years, the principal component analysis identifies two major 
factors, which, taken together, explain a large percentage of the variability in the 
sample (between 78 and 82%).
10 Our interpretation of the factor solutions is the 
following. 
Factor 1 may be interpreted as a broad measure of technological infrastructures and 
human skills. This principal component loads in fact very high on all the variables 
measuring technological infrastructures (telephone penetration and electricity 
consumption) and those measuring education levels and human skills (tertiary science 
and engineering enrolment, mean years of schooling, and literacy rate). The extraction 
of this first factor shows that these two aspects of technological capabilities, 
infrastructures and human skills, are highly correlated and strongly complementary to 
each other. Both of them contribute to define each country’s ability to imitate and to 
implement foreign advanced technologies (Abramovitz, 1986), which is a key 
requirement for developing economies that try to reduce the huge gap that separates 
them from the technological frontier. Factor 1, a linear combination of these five 
variables, accounts for around 45% of the variance in the sample in both periods, and 
it therefore appears as a very relevant dimension to investigate cross-country 
differences in technological capabilities in the 1990s.  
Factor 2 may be interpreted as a measure of the creation and diffusion of codified 
knowledge. It is highly correlated with variables measuring the creation of codified 
technological knowledge by private firms and the public sector (i.e. patents per capita 
and the production of scientific articles), and its diffusion (measured by the Internet 
penetration). The factor indicates that the creation and diffusion of advanced 
                                                                                                                                            
 
9 The eight indicators of countries’ technological capabilities have been standardized before entering 
the factor analysis. The general formula used to standardize the indicators adopts the “distance from the 
best and the worst performers” method of standardization, which is the same used for the indicators 
composing the Technology Achievement Index (UNDP, 2001; Desai et al., 2002) and the ArCo 
Technology Index (Archibugi and Coco, 2004a and 2004b). Different methods of standardization could 
have been used, but the choice of a different standardization method would have not affected the results 
of the factor analysis. 
 
10 The graphical inspection of the so-called Scree diagram (available on request) indicates that the 
extraction of additional factors after the second contributes only marginally to the overall percentage of 
variance explained. The two-factor solution may thus be regarded as the most efficient, in the sense 
that it explains a large portion of the variability in the sample by using only a small number of factors.  
  6technologies are to a large extent related and complementary aspects of countries’ 
technological activities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Both contribute to determine the 
innovative capability, which is a fundamental requirement to compete in the modern 
knowledge-based economy, particularly for countries that are already close to the 
technological frontier. Factor 2 is a linear combination of these three variables, and it 
accounts for about one third of the variance in the sample. Thus, together with factor 
1, it appears to be a very important aspect to study differences in technological 
capabilities in the world economy. 
Figure 1 reports the kernel density estimates of the statistical distributions of these 
two principal components in 1990 and 2000. The graphs show clearly that the shapes 
of the distributions of the two factors are very different. The thick and long left tail of 
factor 1 suggests the existence of a great cross-country variability of technological 
infrastructures and human skills within the large group of less developed economies. 
On the contrary, factor 2 shows a long right tail, which indicates that innovative 
capabilities are very low for most developing countries in the sample, while they vary 
significantly within the group of middle income and advanced countries. Given that 
the purpose of this paper is to analyse differences in technological capabilities in a 
very large sample of 131 countries, including both developing and developed 
economies, both factors identified by the principal component analysis will be used in 
the subsequent empirical analysis.  
  7 
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per capita  0,18  0,86  0,17  0,89 
Scientific 
articles  0,35  0,86  0,34  0,89 
Internet 
penetration   0,28  0,78  0,38  0,81 
Telephone 
penetration  0,86  0,34  0,86  0,34 
Electricity 
consumption  0,85  0,29  0,84  0,34 
Tertiary S&E 
enrolment  0,74  0,29  0,65  0,51 
Mean years  
of schooling  0,80  0,42  0,79  0,45 
Literacy 
rate  0,91  0,12  0,91  0,10 
% of variance 
explained  46,27 32,00 45,12 37,21 
Cumulative % of 
variance explained  46,27 78,28 45,12 82,33 
 
* Extraction method: Principal components. 
   Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization. 
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of the two principal components * 
 
 















































































* Epanechnikov kernel function. 
Halfwidth of kernel: Factor 1: 0,20; Factor 2: 0,25. 
 
 
3.  Technology clubs and technology gaps  
We will now use these two principal components to investigate the existence and the 
characteristics of different technology clubs in the world economy in the 1990s. This 
section presents the results of a cluster analysis that divides the world economy into a 
few country groups characterized by different levels of technological development.
11  
Two different specifications of the cluster analysis have been tested. In the first, the 
two principal components extracted by the factor analysis in the previous section have 
been used as inputs in the clustering algorithm. In the second, two variables have been 
                                                 
11 Recent empirical works using cluster analysis to identify different clubs of countries have been 
presented by Desdoigts (1999), Hobijn and Franses (2000), Canova (2004) and Paap et al. (2005). 
  
  9used instead: the literacy rate (corresponding to factor 1) and the number of scientific 
articles per capita (corresponding to factor 2). These two variables have been selected 
because (i) they are the ones more strongly correlated to each component of the factor 
analysis (see table 1), and because (ii) they are the ones whose distribution shapes are 
more similar to those of the two components. In other words, this means that these 
two variables are those that best represent (and most closely correspond to) the factors 
extracted in the factor analysis.
12  
As it is well known, the results of cluster analysis may change substantially when 
different methods are applied to the same dataset. In order to overcome this problem, 
we have run around thirty different clustering algorithms. For each of the two 
specifications, we have proceeded in three steps. First, three distinct hierarchical 
agglomerative methods have been applied (between groups linkage, within groups 
linkage, Ward’s method), and three different ways to measure the distance between 
cases have been used (Euclidean, squared Euclidean, and cosine distance). Secondly, 
after having identified the main resulting clusters, an iterative partitioning method (K-
means procedure) has been applied to check the robustness of the results of the 
hierarchical agglomerative analysis. Additionally, each clustering algorithm has been 
run by using as inputs the factors (and the corresponding variables) in both 1990 and 
in 2000, so to assess the stability of the resulting clusters over time. 
The methodology that we have employed has three advantages: (i) it makes it possible 
to check the robustness of the results to changes in the variables used as inputs, in the 
clustering method, and in the distance measurement adopted; (ii) it allows 
investigating whether the resulting clusters are stable over time between 1990 and 
2000, both in terms of cluster characteristics and cluster membership; (iii) the 
hierarchical agglomerative method employed is able to identify endogenously the 
number of clusters that forms the best partition of the dataset (see Appendix 1). 
All of the clustering algorithms have produced three main clusters, and this result 
appears to be robust to modifications in the method applied, in the definition of 
distance measurement adopted, and in the variables used as inputs in the analysis. The 
existence of three different groups of countries is also apparent from a graphical 
inspection of the kernel density estimates of the two principal components, which 
                                                 
12 Both variables have been standardized before entering the clustering algorithms, as it is customary in 
cluster analysis. 
  10indicate that both of them, and particularly factor 1, are characterized by a three peaks 
distribution (see Figure 1, section 2).  
The three resulting clusters are to a large extent the same in 1990 and 2000, with only 
a few changes of cluster memberships between the two periods, thus showing a 
remarkable stability of the resulting clusters during the decade. The major 
characteristics of these three technology clubs are presented in table 2, the 
technological distance between them is shown in table 3, and the cluster membership 
is reported in Appendix 2. The three groups can be described as follows. 
 
Cluster 1: Advanced. This is the group of more technologically advanced countries, 
composed by a small set of industrialized economies (between 15 and 21 countries, 
less than 15% of the sample’s population) that hold approximately 40% of the world 
GDP. It comprises the traditional leaders, US and Japan, Continental and Northern 
European economies, and Western offshoots (Australia, Canada, Israel and New 
Zealand). The cluster membership is quite stable over time, the main difference being 
the entry of a few very dynamic Asian NICs (Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Singapore) into this restricted technology club in 2000.  
Table 2 shows that at the beginning of the period the group is characterized by high 
levels of creation and diffusion of codified knowledge (on average, around 69 patents, 
627 scientific articles and 27 Internet users per capita), well-developed technological 
infrastructures (in terms of both telephones and electricity consumption), and high 
levels of basic and advanced education (nearly 11% tertiary enrolment ratio in science 
and engineering, 10 mean years of schooling, and 99% literacy rate).  
The cluster does also prove to be very dynamic over time, with rapid growth rates of 
technological capabilities between 1990 and 2000, particularly in terms of patents 
(+40%), Internet users (+986%), telephones (+104%) and tertiary enrolment ratios in 
science and engineering (nearly +60%). Thus, the technological frontier has advanced 
rapidly in the last decade, making the catching-up process of follower countries more 
and more demanding. 
 
Cluster 2: Followers.  This is a larger group, composed by around 70 countries 
(around 27% of the sample’s population in 1990) that accounted for 36% of the world 
GDP at the beginning of the period. The cluster membership is quite stable between 
1990 and 2000, and its core is constituted by catching-up economies from South-East 
  11Asia, the South of Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, plus the large group of 
Former Socialist countries.  
There are only a few notable changes to this general pattern over time. In 2000, the 
main exit is constituted by a small set of dynamic Asian and Continental European 
economies that abandon the group and move towards the ‘advanced’ technology club, 
while the entry is that of a small number of fast catching-up developing countries, 
from Asia, the Middle East, Central America and Africa, which have rapidly 
improved their technological capabilities in the 1990s. 
Compared to the advanced cluster, this group shows a much lower ability to create 
and to imitate advanced knowledge, as measured by the number of patents, scientific 
articles and Internet users. In fact, table 3 indicates that at the beginning of the 1990s 
the innovation-gap between the ‘advanced and the ‘followers’ group is very huge 
(around 16:1 for patents, 9:1 for articles and 11:1 for Internet users). Over the decade, 
the technological distance has gradually decreased in terms of patents and articles, 
and much more rapidly in terms of Internet users. However, the innovation-gap vis-à-
vis the economies in the advanced cluster does remain considerable at the end of the 
decade. On the other hand, the technological distance between this second group and 
the more advanced one is significantly lower in terms of infrastructures (around 3:1 
for telephones and electricity), and education levels (between 1,5 and 2:1), in both 
1990 and 2000.  
 
Cluster 3: Marginalized. This is the largest group of countries, accounting for more 
than 60% of the sample’s population in 1990, but producing only around 23% of the 
world GDP at the beginning of the decade. The core of this cluster is constituted by 
large Asian economies plus nearly all of African countries. The group membership is 
rather stable in the 1990s, although a restricted number of dynamic economies have 
managed to catch up and to join the more advanced ‘followers’ cluster in 2000 (e.g. 
China, Indonesia, Vietnam, Iran, Oman, and a very few countries from Central 
America and Africa).  
In terms of the ability to create and to imitate new technologies, this group is not only 
remarkably far from the technological frontier, but also quite distant from the follower 
countries in the second cluster. Table 3 shows in fact that at the beginning of the 
period the technological distance between the ‘followers’ and the ‘marginalized’ 
groups is around 190:1 in terms of patents, 14:1 for scientific articles, and 270:1 for 
  12Internet users. During the decade, the gap has diminished very rapidly in terms of 
Internet users, but it has significantly widened for patents and articles.  
Regarding the indicators of technological infrastructures and human skills, the 
distance  vis-à-vis the ‘followers’ cluster at the beginning of the period is equally 
striking, particularly in terms of telephones (12,2:1), electricity consumption (9,7:1) 
and tertiary enrolment ratio in science and engineering (5,2:1). Over the 1990s, the 
gap in terms of technological infrastructures and human skills has decreased slowly, 
but it still remains huge at the end of the decade.  
 
In short, the results of the cluster analysis lead to the identification of three 
technology clubs with markedly different levels of technological development. The 
characteristics of these technology clubs closely resemble those of the ‘innovation’, 
‘imitation’ and ‘stagnation’ groups identified by Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes’ (2005) 
recent model. Our findings indicate the existence of two large technology-gaps in the 
world economy: the first refers to the great distance that separates the group of 
‘followers’ from the technological frontier, particularly in terms of innovative 
capabilities; the second refers to the impressive gap that separates the ‘marginalized’ 
from the ‘followers’ clubs, both in terms of innovative capabilities and of 
infrastructures and human capital.  




  Cluster 1: 
 





2000 1990  2000  1990  2000 
 
Patents granted  
in USPTO** 
 




627,36 670,65 68,56 90,54  4,94  5,63 
 
Internet users  
(1994 & 2000)*** 
 
26,67 289,77 2,48 57,32 0,01  3,51 
 
Fixed and mobile 
telephones*** 
 
516,78 1055,92 163,07 404,72 13,36  47,14 
 
Electricity consumption 
(kilowatt per hour  
per capita) 
 
9411,5 10450,9 2584,1 2989,4 265,8  318,5 
 
Tertiary S&E  
enrolment ratio 
 
10,87 17,31 6,68 9,33 1,28  2,06 
 
Mean years  
of schooling**** 
 




98,66 98,80 91,29  93,86  58,01  67,57 
 
* The list of countries included in each cluster is reported in Appendix 2. 
** Per million people 
*** Per thousand people 
**** Population over 14 
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          Advanced  
            vs. 




  Followers  
  vs.  














9,15 7,40  13,87  16,09 
 
Internet users 
(1994 & 2000) 
 
10,77 5,05  270,6  16,32 
 
Fixed and mobile 
telephones 
 





3,64 3,50  9,72  9,39 
 
Tertiary S&E  
enrolment ratio 
 
1,63 1,85  5,21  4,54 
 
Mean years  
of schooling 
 




1,08 1,05  1,57  1,39 
 
* The first and second columns report the ratio between technological capabilities in the ‘advanced’ 
and ‘followers’ clusters, in 1990 and 2000. The third and fourth columns report the ratio between 
technological capabilities in the ‘followers’ and ‘marginalized’ clusters in 1990 and 2000. 
 
 
4.  Technological convergence and divergence over the 1990s 
The existence of different technology clubs in the world economy is not only 
interesting per se, but it is also relevant because it may contribute to shed new light on 
the issue of convergence and divergence, which has increasingly attracted the 
attention of growth theorists in the last couple of decades. This section shifts therefore 
the focus to the dynamics of convergence and divergence in technology over the 
1990s.  
Our analysis of convergence differs from most previous contributions in applied 
growth theory in two main respects. First, we focus on the dynamics of technology, 
  15rather than that of income or GDP per capita. This is important, because technological 
change is a major engine of economic growth, so that the identification of empirical 
patterns in terms of technological convergence and divergence may have important 
implications for understanding the current and future evolution of the world income 
distribution. Secondly, given that data on technological capability for a large sample 
of countries are only available for a relatively short period of time, we focus on 
convergence and divergence over the 1990s. This time span is relatively short, but it 
refers to a particularly interesting and significant period of the world economy, given 
that the 1990s mark the emergence and rapid diffusion of the new ICT-based general-
purpose technologies. In this context, the analysis of technological convergence and 
divergence is of paramount importance for studying whether the diffusion of the new 
technologies is leading to decreasing or increasing polarization between rich and poor 
countries. 
The analysis proceeds by considering four different notions of convergence. Two of 
them, β-convergence and σ-convergence, are well known and widely used in applied 
growth theory. In addition, we will put forward two new concepts of convergence, ‘Q-
convergence’ and ‘cluster convergence’, which represent refinements of the standard 
definitions, and which make it possible to shed new light on the evolution of the 
world distribution of technological capabilities. 
 
4.1 β-convergence 
The notion of β-convergence is the most widely used in growth theory, and it has 
been studied by a huge amount of empirical works (for overviews, see Temple, 1999, 
and Islam, 2003). The standard approach in so-called cross-country growth 
regressions is to study the relationships between the growth of GDP per capita and a 
set of explanatory variables, the most important of which is the level of income at the 
beginning of the period. If the estimated coefficient of the latter turns out to be 
negative in the estimations, this is taken as evidence of (conditional) β-convergence, 
meaning that, on average, poor countries grow more rapidly than rich ones.  
In line with this standard approach in growth theory, we investigate here the 
hypothesis of β-convergence in technology, that is the possibility that countries with 
lower levels of technological development experience a more dynamic technological 
performance than countries with higher levels (Gerschenkron, 1962; Abramovitz, 
  161986). In this study of technological convergence, the dependent variable is hence the 
growth of technology over the 1990s, where technology is calculated by using the 
ArCo indicators presented in section 2. Given that there exists no previous theory or 
model suggesting other conditioning variables to include in these technology 
regressions, the level of technology at the beginning of the 1990s is the only 
explanatory variable that we include. This means that we refer here to a simple 
definition of unconditional β-convergence in technology, which is studied by running 
the following cross-country regression: 
 
gi = α + β yi,0 + εi                                                                                                         (1) 
 
where gi is the average growth of the technology indicator i over the period, and yi is 
the log of the technology indicator i at the beginning of the 1990s (where i = 1 to 8). 
The first column of table 4 reports the estimated β coefficients, which turn out to be 
negative in all the regressions.
13 All indicators suggest therefore the existence of β-
convergence in technology, where the speed of convergence is more rapid for Internet 
and the literacy rate variables (6,6% and 2,5% respectively), and much slower for all 
other indicators (lower than 1%).  
The notion of β-convergence provides a simple and intuitive idea of the growth 
behaviour of the average of the distribution of the technology indicators, but it tells 
nothing about the evolution of the whole distribution over time. As such, it is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for convergence (Quah, 1993). It is thus 
important to look at the convergence issue also from a different perspective. 
 
4.2 Q-convergence 
We propose here a refinement of the notion of β-convergence that may be defined as 
Q-convergence. The idea is to study β-convergence by estimating a set of quantile 
regressions instead of one single ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as 
customary in the convergence literature. While an OLS regression estimates the 
conditional mean function, thus giving an idea of the behaviour of the average of the 
distribution, a quantile regression estimates a conditional quantile (percentile) 
                                                 
13 Other details of the regression results, such as the overall significance and the t-statistic for each 
estimated coefficient, have not been reported to save some space, and are available on request. 
  17function, and therefore makes it possible to analyse the behaviour of different parts of 
the distribution, including the tails (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker and Hallock, 
2001).  
The application of this non-parametric method of estimation to the study of 
convergence leads us to propose the novel concept of Q-convergence. The latter is 
thus investigated by running a set of j quantile regressions of the form: 
 
gi,j = α + β yi,j,0 + εi,j                                                                                                     (2) 
 
where j is the jth quantile of gi (i.e. the jth percentile of the growth distribution of the 
technology indicator i). In other words, we estimate a set of j cross-country 
regressions, each of which analyses the hypothesis of unconditional β-convergence in 
technology at a different quantile of the distribution. Q-convergence may therefore be 
investigated by looking at the vector [βj], where the j different components of the 
vector are the coefficients βj estimated from the quantile regressions (2). By looking 
at different percentiles of the growth distribution, Q-convergence thus provides a 
more complete characterization of the dynamics of technological convergence than 
the simpler notion of β-convergence is able to do. 
The results for our ArCo technology indicators are presented in the right-hand side of 





th quantiles of its growth distribution.
14 For all of the 
indicators, the results show that the β coefficient differs substantially across the 
distribution. In general terms, the speed of convergence is much greater (smaller) at 
upper (lower) quantiles. Besides, for the variables measuring patents, scientific 
articles and telephony, the estimated β coefficient turns out to have a positive sign in 
correspondence to the lower part of the distribution.  
The interpretation of this finding is straightforward. When we focus on the upper 
quantiles of the growth distribution, i.e. those corresponding to the most dynamic 
countries in the sample (e.g. China, Asian NICs, etc.), we observe a rapid process of 
technological convergence, meaning that a few developing economies have been able 
to grow more rapidly than the other fast growing countries in the sample (which are 
                                                 
14 Similarly to the OLS regressions previously discussed, other details of the quantile regression results, 
such as the pseudo R-squared and the t-statistic for each estimated coefficient, have not been reported 
to save some space, and are available on request. 
  18mostly rich economies already close to the technological frontier). However, 
technological convergence is by no means a characterizing feature of the whole 
sample. In fact, when we focus on the lower quantiles of the distribution, poor 
countries have in most cases not been able to develop their technological capabilities 
more rapidly than industrialized economies. This is particularly evident for the 
indicators of patents, scientific articles and telephony, where we indeed observe 
technological divergence.   
In short, the notion of Q-convergence makes it possible to refine the generic (and to 
some extent misleading) picture presented by the concept of β-convergence, and 
points out that different parts of the distribution are characterized by very different 
dynamics and speed of technological convergence. In our study, β-convergence 
constitutes a useful approximation of the growth behaviour of a few dynamic catching 
up countries, but it does not provide a precise characterization of the dynamics of 
several other low performing countries. This point is very relevant for our analysis of 
technology clubs, and the next two definitions of convergence will investigate it 
further. 
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-0,1% +0,94%  +0,30%  -0,46% -0,78% 
 
Internet users 
(1994 & 2000) 
 











-0,4% -0,27%  -0,19%  -0,28% -0,32% 
 
Tertiary S&E  
enrolment ratio 
 
-0,8% -0,31%  -0,46%  -0,74% -1,38% 
 
Mean years  
of schooling 
 




-2,5% -2,20%  -2,44%  -2,77% -3,22% 
 
* The first column reports the β-convergence coefficient estimated from OLS regressions (1). The 
other four columns report the coefficients of convergence βj estimated from quantile regressions (2), 




While the β-convergence hypothesis focuses on the central tendency of the 
distribution and investigates the catching up process of poor vs. rich countries, σ-
convergence studies whether the dispersion of a target variable has increased or 
decreased over time, and it thus provides a synthetic measure of the dynamics of the 
variability of its distribution. The notion of σ-convergence has increasingly been used 
in applied growth theory in recent years, and it has constituted the basis for 
  20developing new methods for analysing the evolution of the world distribution of 
income over time (Quah, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c).  
Table 5 presents the results of the analysis of σ-convergence for our technology 
indicators. The first two columns report the coefficient of variation of each indicator 
in 1990 and 2000, and the third column presents their rate of change over the 1990s, 
which represents a synthetic measure of σ-convergence. The table indicates that all of 
the technology variables are characterised by a decreasing dispersion over time, and 
that the speed of σ-convergence is particularly rapid for the indicators of Internet, 
telephony and the literacy rate (between 20 and 30%), and very low for the variable 
measuring the tertiary enrolment ratio (less than 2%).  
These results give basic support to the findings related to the β- and Q-convergence 
analysis presented above, which suggest that, in general terms, the evolution of the 
world distribution of technological capabilities over the 1990s is characterized by an 
overall pattern of convergence, though different groups of countries seem to have 
experienced very different dynamics of technological change. This leads to the last 
part of our convergence analysis, which looks more specifically at the behaviour and 
relative dynamics of different groups of countries in the world economy. 
 
4.4 Cluster convergence 
This is a new notion of convergence, which may be considered as a refinement of the 
concept of σ-convergence. It develops naturally from the cluster analysis presented in 
section 3, which has pointed out the existence of three technology clubs with 
markedly different levels of technological development. A general definition of 
cluster convergence may be the following: given a statistical distribution partitioned 
into k clusters, cluster convergence arises when the centre of a group gets closer to the 
centre of the upper cluster over time.
15 For our technology clubs, we therefore 
observe cluster convergence if the centre of the ‘followers’ (‘marginalized’) cluster 
has come closer to the centre of the ‘advanced’ (‘followers’) club, i.e. if the 
technological distance between them has diminished over the 1990s.  
This notion refines the one of σ-convergence because it makes it possible to 
investigate whether the observed decrease in the dispersion of the technology 
                                                 
15 A similar concept of convergence has been recently put forward by Giles (2005) and Giles and Feng 
(2005). 
  21indicators over the 1990s has been determined by a rapid catching up of the followers 
vis-à-vis the technological frontier, or by a rapid catching up of the marginalized vis-
à-vis the followers, or by both of them.  
The results of the cluster convergence analysis are presented in the right-hand side of 
table 5. The table shows that the club of followers has on average decreased its 
technological distance from the advanced group for nearly all the indicators. This 
catching up process has been particularly rapid not only in terms of Internet users and 
telephony (reflecting the worldwide diffusion of ICTs), but also with respect to 
innovative capabilities (patents and scientific articles), which is precisely the aspect 
where the technology-gap between the followers and the advanced clubs is more 
evident (see section 3). The only exception to this general trend of convergence refers 
to the tertiary enrolment ratio, whose technology-gap vis-à-vis the frontier has 
increased of around 14%, due to the very rapid increase of tertiary education in most 
advanced countries in the period. 
When we turn the attention to the dynamics of the marginalized vis-à-vis the 
followers club, however, the picture is quite different. Here, convergence is rapid only 
in terms of Internet and telephony, and rather slow for all other indicators of 
technological infrastructures and education levels (i.e. electricity consumption, 
tertiary enrolment ratio, years of schooling and literacy rate). On the other hand, the 
innovation-gap between the marginalized and the followers clubs has significantly 
increased (patents: +24,7%; scientific articles: +16%), indicating that the group of 
marginalized economies has not been able to improve its innovative capabilities, 
while the other two groups have been very dynamic in this respect. This is in line with 
the finding of the Q-convergence analysis presented above, which suggests the 
existence of divergence and increasing polarization at the lower quantiles of the 
distributions of these two indicators. 
This result is a reason of serious concern for the future of the world economy. Given 
that innovation is a key requirement to compete in the modern knowledge-based 
economy, the increasing polarization between rich and poor countries in terms of 
innovative capabilities may in fact lead to greater disparities in income and GDP per 
capita in the years ahead.   
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2,10 1,94  -7,6%  -19,0%  +16,0% 
 
Internet users 
(1994 & 2000) 
 











0,53 0,49  -7,5%  -4,0%  -3,4% 
 
Tertiary S&E  
enrolment ratio 
 
1,03 1,01  -1,9%  +13,8%  -12,9% 
 
Mean years  
of schooling 
 




0,34 0,27  -20,6%  -2,6%  -11,7% 
 
* The first two columns report the coefficient of variation in 1990 and 2000 respectively, where the 
coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean. The third column 
shows the rate of change of the coefficient of variation over time, which is a measure of σ-convergence 
over the 1990s. The fourth (fifth) column reports the rate of change of the technology-gap between the 
advanced (followers) and followers (marginalized) clubs. These rates of change represent our measure 
of cluster convergence, and have been calculated from the levels of the technology-gaps in 1990 and 
2000, reported in table 3 above. 
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5. Conclusions 
In the last ten years, applied growth theory has developed rapidly. Empirical works 
have progressively moved away from the traditional cross-country regression 
framework, and, using a set of heterogeneous econometric methods, they have shown 
the existence of great differences in economic growth across different groups of 
countries (the convergence clubs) and of increasing polarization in income per capita 
between the rich and the poor clubs (so-called ‘emerging twin peaks’).  
These recent empirical findings call for an explanation. The focus in growth theory 
has so far been on the rates of accumulation of physical and human capital, while the 
role of technology has frequently been neglected by the more recent empirical 
literature. This paper has argued that technology is a major factor to explain growth 
differences across countries, and that it is therefore important to explore how the 
recent empirical findings on clustering and polarization may be related to cross-
country differences in the ability to create, imitate and implement new technologies. 
In particular, the purpose of the paper has been to study the existence, characteristics 
and dynamics of different technology clubs in the world economy.  
The analysis has been empirical in nature, and it has made use of the ArCo database, 
that contains a set of indicators of technology for a large sample of 131 (developed 
and developing) economies for the period 1990-2000. Taking into account the 
complex and multifaceted nature of the concept of technology, the indicators that we 
have considered refer to several relevant aspects, such as the ability to create and to 
imitate new technologies, the level of technological infrastructures and the level of 
education and human skills. 
Section 2 has presented the eight indicators used to measure these various aspects of 
countries’ technological capabilities. Many of these aspects, we have argued, 
represent strictly related and complementary dimensions of countries’ technological 
capabilities, and the relative indicators tend to be highly correlated. Therefore, the 
section has presented the results of a factor analysis, whose purpose has been to 
reduce this large set of indicators to a smaller group of distinct (uncorrelated) 
dimensions. The factor analysis has extracted two major factors: factor 1, a broad 
measure of technological infrastructures and human skills, and factor 2, representing 
the creation and diffusion of codified knowledge. While the former factor 
discriminates well among less advanced economies, the latter is better able to identify 
  24differences within the group of more advanced countries. Both factors have therefore 
been used to study cross-country differences in technological capabilities in our large 
sample of developing and developed economies. 
Section 3 has presented the results of a hierarchical cluster analysis that has explored 
the existence of various groups of countries differing in terms of their levels of 
technological development. The results of the cluster analysis have proved to be 
robust to modifications in the clustering method, and stable over time between 1990 
and 2000. They show the existence of three technology clubs characterized by very 
different levels of technology: (i) a restricted group of ‘advanced’ economies, 
characterized by high levels of technological infrastructures and human skills, and a 
great ability to innovate and to imitate; (ii) a cluster of ‘follower’ countries, with a 
medium level of technological infrastructures, medium-high human skills, and a low 
ability to innovate; (iii) a large group of ‘marginalized’ economies, characterized by 
low infrastructures and human skills, and a scarce ability to innovate and to imitate. 
The characteristics of these technology clubs closely resemble those of the 
‘innovation’, ‘imitation’ and ‘stagnation’ groups recently identified by Howitt and 
Mayer-Foulkes’ (2005) Schumpeterian model. The identification of these technology 
clubs is important, because it suggests that the existence of convergence clubs pointed 
out in the recent applied growth literature may be related not only to different initial 
conditions in terms of economic aspects, but also to cross-country differences in the 
ability to create, imitate and adopt new technologies.  
A second reason of interest in these findings is that our analysis indicates the 
existence of two large technology-gaps in the world economy, and provides a measure 
of these gaps: the first refers to the great distance that separates the group of followers 
from the technological frontier, particularly in terms of innovative capabilities; the 
second refers to the impressive gap that separates the marginalized from the followers 
clubs, both in terms of innovative capabilities and of infrastructures and human 
capital. The existence of technology gaps is not by itself a surprising fact, but the 
quantification of these gaps provides a useful indication, particularly for technology-
gap and Schumpeterian analytical growth models, where the dynamics of knowledge 
diffusion is dependent on the size of the technological distance (e.g. Verspagen, 1991; 
Howitt, 2000; Stokke, 2004; Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005).  
Section 4 has then shifted the focus to the study of the dynamics of convergence and 
divergence among these technology clubs over the 1990s. The analysis in terms of β- 
  25and σ-convergence has shown that, for all of the indicators, an overall pattern of 
technological convergence has characterized the world economy in the 1990s. This 
catching up process and the related decrease in the dispersion of the technology 
variables has been particularly strong for the literacy rate, as well as for Internet users 
and telephony, thus suggesting that the rapid diffusion of ICTs have apparently not 
led to increasing disparities between rich and poor countries. 
The concepts of β- and σ-convergence provide useful synthetic measures of the 
central tendency and variability of the world distribution of technology, but they do 
not make it possible to analyse the relative dynamics of different groups of countries. 
Therefore, in order to get a more precise characterization of the cross-country 
dynamics of technological change, we have proposed and used two new notions of 
convergence. One is Q-convergence, where the idea is to study β-convergence by 
estimating a set of quantile regressions for different percentiles of the technology 
growth distribution, instead of one single OLS regression as customary in the 
convergence literature. The other refinement is the notion of cluster convergence, 
which arises when, given a distribution partitioned into k clusters, the centre of a 
group gets closer to the centre of the upper cluster over time. 
The analysis of Q- and cluster convergence has indicated that the technology clubs are 
characterized by very different patterns of technological change and catching up. The 
club of followers, in fact, has on the whole converged towards the technological 
frontier in terms of nearly all the indicators, including those measuring innovative 
capabilities (patents and articles) where its technology-gap was more evident at the 
beginning of the period. On the other hand, the club of marginalized countries has 
been able to catch up with respect to technological infrastructures and human skills 
(i.e. those variables related to the first principal component of the factor analysis), but 
not in terms of innovative capabilities (patents and articles, corresponding to the 
second principal component).  
In other words, while the dynamics of infrastructures and skills (factor 1) has led to a 
process of convergence for both parts of the distribution, middle-income and poor 
economies, the dynamics of innovative capabilities (factor 2) has determined a pattern 
that closely resembles the popular twin-peaks result (Quah, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c): an 
increasing polarization between rich and poor countries, and a process of gradual 
catching up (or vanishing) of the middle-income group.  
  26Innovation is a major engine of growth, and a key capability to compete in the modern 
knowledge-based economy. Thus, greater disparities in innovative activities between 
rich and poor economies might possibly determine increasing inequalities in income 
and GDP per capita in the near future. The relationship between twin-peaks in 
innovative capabilities and twin-peaks in income is an interesting topic for future 
research. 
 
  27Appendix 1: Why three clusters? 
Section 3 has presented the results of the cluster analysis, according to which there 
exist three major technology clubs with markedly different levels of technological 
development. Why has the cluster analysis identified just three, instead of, say, two, 
four, five or more groups of countries?  
The clustering method that we have employed, the hierarchical agglomerative 
clustering algorithm, makes it possible to identify endogenously the number of groups 
that forms the best partition of the data. In hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis, 
all the cases are initially treated as individual clusters. Then, at each step, the most 
similar cases are merged together according to the nXn similarity matrix. In the final 
step, all cases are merged into one large group. The sequence of mergers of clusters 
can be represented visually by a tree diagram, the dendogram. This makes it possible 
to identify the main clusters being formed at each step, their membership, and the 
right number of steps at which to evaluate the results. In fact, an agglomeration 
schedule records the similarity (or, put it differently, the distance) between the two 
clusters being merged at each step of the algorithm. The best partition of the data is 
the one corresponding to the highest drop in the similarity coefficient (or, 
analogously, to the greatest increase in the distance) between two successive steps.  
Figure 2 represents the drop in the similarity coefficient as a function of the number 
of clusters (from 2 to 10) for our ArCo dataset, in both 1990 and 2000 (by using the 
between-groups method and the cosine distance measurement). The graph shows 
clearly that three is the number of clusters that maximizes the drop in the similarity 
coefficient, i.e. the one that forms the best partition of the data. 
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Figure 2: Drop in the similarity coefficient as a function of the number of clusters, 
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Cluster 3:  
Marginalized 
    
 Asian    Asian 
  ← Hong Kong  ← China 
  ← South Korea  ← Indonesia 
  ← Singapore  ← Vietnam 
  Malaysia Bangladesh 
Established leaders  Philippines India 
Japan Thailand  Mongolia 
United States  Fiji  Nepal 
   Papua  New  Guinea 
Continental European  Continental European  Pakistan 
Germany  ← Austria  Sri Lanka 
Netherlands  ← Belgium   
Switzerland  ← France   
United Kingdom  Luxembourg   
   
Northern European  Southern European   
Denmark Cyprus   
Finland Greece   
Iceland Ireland   
Norway Italy   
Sweden Malta   
 Portugal  
Western offshoots  Spain  
Australia Turkey   
Canada     
New Zealand  Middle East  Middle East 
Israel Bahrain  ← Iran, Islamic Republic 
 Jordan  ← Oman 
 Kuwait  Yemen,  Republic 
 Lebanon  
 Saudi  Arabia  
  Syrian Arab Republic   
  United Arab Emirates   
   
  Latin American  Latin American 
 Argentina  ← El Salvador 
 Bolivia  ← Guyana 
 Brazil  ← Honduras 
 Chile  Guatemala 
 Colombia  Haiti 
 Costa  Rica  Nicaragua 
 Dominican  Republic  
 Ecuador  
 Jamaica  
 Mexico   
  Panama  
 Paraguay  
 Peru  
 Puerto  Rico  
 Uruguay  
  30 Venezuela,  RB  
     
  African African 
 South  Africa  ← Algeria 
  Trinidad and Tobago  ← Botswana 
   ← Mauritius 
    ← Tunisia 
   ← Zimbabwe 
    Benin 
   Cameroon 
  Former socialist  Central African 
 Armenia  Congo,  Rep. 
 Azerbaijan  Cote  d'Ivoire 
  Belarus  Egypt, Arab Rep. 
 Bulgaria  Gabon 
 Croatia  Ghana 
 Czech  Republic  Kenya 
 Georgia  Lesotho 
 Estonia  Madagascar 
 Hungary  Malawi 
 Kazakhstan  Morocco 
 Kyrgyz  Republic  Mozambique 
 Latvia  Namibia 
 Lithuania  Nigeria 
 Macedonia,  FYR  Senegal 
 Moldova  Sudan 
 Poland  Swaziland 
 Romania  Tanzania 
 Russian  Federation  Togo 
 Slovak  Republic  Uganda 
 Slovenia  Zambia 
 Tajikistan   
 Turkmenistan  Former socialist 
  Ukraine  ← Albania 
 Uzbekistan   
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